# AIOil Security Shield — Scan Report

**Scan ID:** `fcedbde98d487709`
**Date:** 2026-07-20T11:30:07.952Z
**Code hash (SHA-256):** `b86d69929bc52849ef0616a083d6dd4b25d4a5ed6b8e7f93b6ffc1457d8fe6ff`
**Verdict:** Vulnerabilities found — review required before deployment

## Summary

| Severity | Count |
|---|---|
| Critical | 0 |
| High | 1 |
| Medium | 0 |
| Low | 0 |

## Findings

### [High] Fee calculation relies on user-provided trade_value_lamports without verification

In `execute_swap_with_fee`, the fee amount is computed from `trade_value_lamports`, which is entirely controlled by the caller. The program has no oracle or cross-instruction verification to confirm the actual swap value. An attacker can supply a small or zero `trade_value_lamports` to pay little or no fee while executing a much larger swap in the same transaction.

**Recommendation:** Implement a mechanism to verify the trade value against an oracle or the output of the swap instruction. Alternatively, require that the swap instruction be called inside the same program (via CPI) so the true value can be observed. If that is not feasible, document the trust assumption clearly and warn users that the fee is honor-based.

## AIOil Devnet

Not yet tested on AIOil Devnet.

## Disclaimer

AIOil Security Shield runs automated, multi-agent static analysis. It is not a professional human audit and does not guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities — it reduces risk, it does not eliminate it.

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Verify this report: https://aioil.tech/verify/fcedbde98d487709